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 Abstract 
The Internet augments the informational flows that organize biographies in 
late modernity. Sufferers of bipolar disorder (manic depression) may turn to 
the Internet for accessible information, to learn about others’ experiences and 
impart their own knowledge. Personal accounts posted in the public domain 
become themselves part of those informational flows, and thus acquire a dual 
life at a boundary between private and public domains. This poses certain 
challenges for the investigation of computer-mediated autobiographical 
telling, which are identified in this paper and negotiated in an analysis of 
downloaded personal accounts of bipolar disorder. Two of the stories are 
selected for a close look. Story 1 tells about achieving long-term remission 
through personal resolve and psychological alternatives to medication. Story 2 
tells about becoming able to talk about the illness through the achievement of 
a social identity as ‘manic depressive’. The stories’ similarities, differences, 
and comparability with the other texts are discussed with a view to theorizing 
how such texts position their implied author in the illness experience. Building 
upon Bakhtin’s idea of a text’s plan and its realization, a concept of ‘identity 
commitments’ as textual properties is proposed. 
 The psychiatric literature describes bipolar disorder (BPD), commonly known 
as manic depression, as a cluster of severe disorders characterized by cycles of 
extreme mood swings (e.g., Bearden, Hoffman, & Cannon, 2001). It is believed to be 
chronic, of organic etiology, possibly genetic, and controllable chiefly by medication. 
As with any serious illness, sufferers may turn to the Internet not only for accessible 
information, but also to learn about others’ experiences and impart their own (cf. 
Davison, Pennebaker & Dickerson 2000). The Internet augments what Giddens 
(1991) described as “a vast and more or less continuous outpouring of writings, 
technical and more popular” that “serve routinely to organize, and alter, the aspects of 
social life they report on or analyze” (p. 14). These flows of information organize the 
biographies that we reflexively live in late modernity, according to Giddens. At the 
same time, personal stories posted in the public domain become themselves part of 
those informational flows. They thus acquire a kind of dual life at a boundary between 
private and public domains. The next section will elaborate this claim. 
The fluidity of boundary, in turn, poses epistemological and methodological 
challenges. The present study aims to identify and negotiate some of those challenges 
through my interaction with the empirical material. The dilemma of the study stems 
from the sides-of-a-coin relationship between the private and public aspects of 
personal stories—a coin that is flipped one side or the other under the scholarly gaze, 
insofar as analytic tools have been developed primarily to examine one aspect or the 
other. Consequently, it is difficult to ‘insert’ this study in some already established 
framework. The study implicitly links to a voluminous body of literature investigating 
the implications of computer-mediated communication (CMC) for self, identity, and 
relationships (e.g., Brothers, 1997; Civin, 1999; Gergen, 1991; Gordo-Lopez & 
Parker, 1999; Granic & Lamey, 2000; McKenna & Bargh, 2000; Talamo & Ligorio, 
2001; more cited below). This literature could not be duly reviewed, partly due to 
space constraints and partly because doing so would involve a digression from the 
specific issue at hand. Likewise understated below is the overlap of the study in the 
diverse literature on mental health and illness, the experience of chronic illness, and 
especially the application of narrative inquiries in this context (e.g., Williams, 1984; 
Faircloth, Boylstein, Rittman et al. 2004; see Stone 2004 for mental-illness 
relevance). A concept of ‘identity commitments’ emerged as a partial answer to the 
above dilemma in my initial efforts to pull together the various meanings of the 
downloaded texts, and subsequently was ‘read off’ from the same empirical material. 
This process is emulated in the structure of the paper, in that I shall in turn describe 
the sample of texts, take a close look at two stories, and then elaborate and apply the 
idea of identity commitments. 
The problematic of autobiographical telling online 
Long before the Internet Walter Benjamin (1936/1999) wrote nostalgically 
about how the storyteller “takes what he tells from experience” and “makes it the 
experience of those who are listening to his tale” (p. 87). He envisaged factory 
workers engaged in such storytelling to relieve their workaday tedium, for instance. 
However, storytelling was being eroded by information technology and mass media: 
“If the art of storytelling has become rare, the dissemination of information has had a 
decisive share in this state of affairs” (p. 88). Kearney (1998) interpreted Benjamin’s 
thesis as a dire prediction foretelling the end of community: “A new culture of 
instantaneous and fragmented sensations would soon replace the inherited wisdom of 
tradition, dissolving history into a series of isolated presents bereft of past and future” 
(p. 241). The Internet belies this prediction in some respects and confirms it in other. 
It enables people to share their experiences on an unprecedented scale, and in this way 
revitalizes storytelling—but virtual communities are created and sustained solely by 
informational flows among individuals who enter and exit each other’s remote 
company at will and exchange their stories in physical solitude. It is as if traditional 
ways of community building are being replaced by a new culture of instantaneous and 
fragmented selves, in whom personal histories dissolve into fleeting subject positions 
immanent in snippets of text (cf. Turkle, 1997). The virtual community is defined 
solely in terms of ‘who’ participates in the production and consumption of particular 
stories. CMC breaks down the interpersonal interaction whereby into a discrete 
sequence of acts separated in time and place. The story is ‘spoken’ by typing it, with 
the possibility of editing and censuring, and is made ‘heard’ by sending it. This is 
further severed from the involvement of the remote audience, whose reactions arrive 
(if at all) at a time lag, sometimes years later. In this respect posting one’s story online 
is similar to publishing in print. Unlike print, one’s story could be ‘published’ whether 
anyone listens or not, provided Internet access and minimal IT literacy. Although the 
online story is more permanent than an oral one, it is malleable, could be revisited and 
revised many times by the writer without a trace of earlier versions, just as an oral 
story is altered in successive performances. Even in synchronous CMC (such as chat 
rooms) the menial act of typing one’s utterance confronts users with their own ‘voice’ 
in ways that oral conversations don’t.  
Online the human subject becomes “a storyteller who both finds herself in 
stories already told and strives for a self-constitution by emploting herself in stories in 
the making”  (Schrag, 1997, p. 26), as was envisaged by the postmodernists ahead of 
CMC (see Turkle, 1997, for a similar thesis). Giddens (1991) submitted that in late 
modernity “the altered self has to be explored and constructed as part of a reflexive 
process of connecting personal and social change” (p. 33). Ironically, CMC induces 
the kind of narcissism that Touraine (1995) argued was an untenable premise of 
Giddens’ thesis; and accentuates the strategic or ‘cognitive’ reflexivity, to the 
conception of which Lash and Urry (1994) objected in their critique of Giddens. The 
reflexive project takes a twist online in the creation of fictional and ‘censured’ 
identities. Turkle (1997) reported that some MUD gamers experienced their 
imaginary personae, created for the game, as more real than their real-life identity. 
Disabled people have identified the choice whether or not to disclose their disability 
in CMC interactions as an important resource, allowing them to experience ‘normal’ 
identities (Bowker & Tuffin, 2002). Weinberger (2002) has drawn attention to the 
“disturbing nature of what passes for normal” in cyberspace: private preoccupations 
are publicly exposed in a highly censured manner in weblogs (online diaries), thereby 
bringing about a “redrawing of the line between public and private” (p. 15).  
Alternatively, the private/public boundary could also be viewed—not as a 
moveable line, redrawn according to changing conventions—but as a domain where 
two continua flow into each other. When someone participates in illness ‘self-help’ 
exchanges whilst keeping the illness a secret in everyday settings, the public becomes 
enfolded into the private. Davison et al. (2000) indeed found that the likelihood of 
participating in CMC rather than face-to-face self-help groups is greater when the 
illness carries a social stigma. In this case the identity negotiation is not a playful 
experimentation or ‘time off’ from one’s biography. On the contrary, it is coextensive 
with narrative reconstruction in the wake of the biographical disruption associated 
with the onset of a serious illness (see, e.g., Williams, 1984; Faircloth et al. 2004). 
Illness-related autobiographical telling may occur as brief stories in synchronous 
CMC contexts, such as studied by Davison et al., and in asynchronous CMC, such as 
monologues, correspondences, or diary entries (this study’s material). Generally, 
synchronous CMC has attracted more research attention than asynchronous 
communication, which might seem more mundane. However, personal stories 
conveyed asynchronously could be viewed as a distinct class of life documents, 
deriving its class distinctiveness from a unique ‘situatedness’ at the fluid 
private/public boundary.  
The ‘phenomenon’ of such documents should be located historically. During 
the 1990s, a rising interest in autobiography opened spaces for personal testimonies, 
and the increasing accessibility of the Internet has enabled ‘ordinary’ people to do so. 
Gullestad (1996) attributes the rise in ‘popular’ consumption of autobiography to the 
weakening of the ‘grand narratives’ of science and politics, trends that have “put 
autobiography, morality, and self-fashioning into the foreground in new and forceful 
ways” (p. 10). This is mirrored in the attenuation of narrative research to issues of 
self-identity. In the ‘postmodern’ disciplines, personal stories have come to be seen as 
primarily sites for identity constructions and as the primary site for identity. Self-
identity is understood as based in “the capacity to keep a particular narrative going” 
(Giddens, 1991, p. 54). The psychological twist is that the narratives we live by need 
not (or cannot) be told at all (cf. McAdams, 1993). Whether or not there are such 
inner narratives, a research interest directly in how individuals understand their illness 
situation calls for a different kind of data than that used here. Lucius-Hoene and 
Deppermann (2000) contend that spontaneous (i.e., not solicited by researchers) short-
range personal stories, because they are “induced by situationally motivated tasks like 
explaining, entertaining, or giving an account of a certain situation or experience,” 
sustain narrative identities that are ephemeral and therefore of doubtful generality (p. 
201). Gergen’s (1994) view of autobiographical narratives as “forms of social 
accounting or public discourse” (p. 188) clearly applies to autobiographical telling 
online, for the story is told with an audience in mind. If the purpose is to communicate 
the message that things can get better and a good life is possible despite BPD, a 
narrative begins at a negatively evaluated situation or ‘crisis’ contingent on the illness 
and ends up positively will be more effective. In accentuating the difference between 
past ordeal and present redemption for the sake of the helpful message, some 
biographical accuracy might be forfeited (as Story 1 below demonstrates). Personal 
stories are posted on the Internet for a variety of reasons such as those listed by 
Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann—but in asynchronous CMC they are not induced by 
any immediate conversation. Rather, their spontaneity is more closely related to their 
writer’s attempt to keep a particular narrative going—a narrative that is not 
necessarily expressed in the specific contents and form of the online story, but in the 
act of telling it (as my analysis of Story 2 will show). Ephemeral as online narrative 
identities might be, they arise from the ‘selfing’ function. An analysis of personal 
accounts potentially shows how selves are produced, although not necessarily which 
‘self’ could be justifiably pegged upon a particular person.  
In the ‘private’ life of the text, the story and its telling are a function of the 
identity processes of the teller. In its ‘public’ life, the story participates in cultural 
discourses in ways that are ‘decoupled’ from that person. For example, 10-year-old 
Peggy who sent her story of BPD to a web site for sick children in the late 1990s 
would be in her late teens or older now, but online the child’s voice lingers on. There 
is a photo of her hugging a cat with a cheerful caption (“I Love cats! In fact I love all 
kinds of animals. Bet you guessed that already!”). Despite the photo, to readers who 
never met her she represents ‘any’ white girl who loves animals, has friends and foes 
in school, likes and dislikes, and happens to have a chronic illness. Peggy’s Story 
commits its protagonist to the identity of a ‘normal child in spite of the illness’ long 
past its writer’s childhood and irrespective of whether this characterization was ever 
salient to her (though it probably was; see Fleitas, 1998). The text performs a 
discourse action  (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992) that the 10-year-old could hardly be 
aware of. Among other things, it reinforces the psychiatric model of BPD as a 
neurobiochemical disorder, the pediatric forms of which have been acknowledged 
relatively recently (e.g., Findling, Gracious, McNamara et al. 2001). In the public life 
of this story, ‘Peggy’ becomes an implied subject (Kerby 1991), a function of the text 
itself, merely one of possible positions that the text opens up. Taking the idea to its 
Foucauldian extreme, the author is evacuated from the flesh-and-blood person upon 
whom it is pegged. “So much so that what comes first is … an anonymous murmur in 
which positions are laid out for possible subjects: ‘the great relentless disordered 
drone of discourse’” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 55). Yet ‘behind’ the embedding of the story 
in the anonymous murmur of public discourse there is, as Freeman (1997) put it, a 
“living, loving, suffering, dying human being” (p. 171). There is someone to whom 
the selection of certain subject-positions and the rejection of other possibilities is 
neither arbitrary nor trivial (Jones, 1997, 1999).  
As a form of social accounting, autobiographical telling is enacted within 
culturally embedded social activities in which various norms and conventions apply 
(Gergen, 1994). In this regard, online autobiographical telling could be approached as 
the kind of performances traditionally studied by anthropologists and folklorists; i.e., 
with a focus on the performance as data, not on the performer as a psychological 
subject. Propp (1984) recommended that the unit of analysis would be the singular 
piece—the whole “poetic system” of the folktale, chant, etc.—along with its 
“application to everyday life”, i.e., when or why it is performed (p. 42). The same 
applies here. Up to a point, this study’s rationale also coincides with the discursive 
psychological focus on the “actual working of discourse as a constitutive part of 
social practices situated in specific contexts” (Potter, Wetherell, Gill & Edwards, 
writing in Parker, 2002, p. 165). The study concerns how personal stories function to 
produce ‘identities’; more specifically, how texts construct conditions for their 
authors’ ownership of the experience being narrated. By virtue of such construction 
the text commits the implied author (the writer as seen by readers through the text) to 
some particular social-moral position. An identity commitment is therefore a function 
of the text, not a mental state of the person whose story it is. Discursive-psychological 
studies typically chart a range of themes and rhetorical moves (interpretative 
repertories) at the aggregate level of analysis, abstracting the ideational units from 
‘pooled’ texts (interview transcripts, etc.).  
In contrast, the present effort to acknowledge the private life of 
autobiographical telling requires a consideration of how elements of the same text 
interrelate so as to produce identity commitments (which could subsequently be 
compared at the group level of analysis). My thinking is indebted to Bakhtin’s view of 
a literary text as an ‘act’ or utterance that orients itself towards the aspect of life to 
which it refers. In an early essay published posthumously, Bakhtin (1993) argued that 
it is “an unfortunate misunderstanding (a legacy of rationalism) to think that … the 
truth of a situation is precisely that which is repeatable and constant in it” (p 37). He 
pointed to the uniqueness of an unrepeatable whole and its actuality:  
The actually performed act—not from the aspect of its content, but in its 
very performance—somehow knows, somehow … orients itself within that 
being, and it does so, moreover, in its entirety—both in its content-aspect 
and in its actual, unique faculty. (p. 28) 
Bakhtin was grappling with the so-called Kantian problem of the relationship between 
experience and its representation (Holquist, 1993). An obvious problem with the 
‘Kantian problem’ is that it posits experience as if outside discourse—and 
experiencing certain physiological states as illness is intrinsically discursive. Taken 
pragmatically, however, a story about the teller’s illness does refer to something that 
has been experienced (and already understood in some way) by that person outside 
the specific ‘actually performed act’ of the story. In the specific text, memories, 
feelings, and ideations constellate in a creative and unrepeatable way, like a dream 
(which theme-wise could be recurrent or common). Also like a dream, the text locates 
its implied author in some relation to the referent experience whether or not the 
narrator is aware of it. The text thus actualizes a particular consciousness of the world 
independently of the conscious intentions and reflections of the person telling the 
story. Unlike a dream, the story is told to actual other people or with a ‘generic’ other 
in mind. Therefore considerations of rhetorical performance and social positioning are 
ultimately relevant (though understated in the present analysis).  
The material 
Setting out to observe situated performances means specifying the situation, 
not abstract features of the performance. The data collection was therefore approached 
as the ‘open’ task of retrieving any asynchronous first-hand account of BPD rather 
than seeking out accounts that conform to some definition of narrative or story. 
‘Story’ is usually equated with a narrative that has a beginning, middle and end (e.g., 
Sarbin, 2004). Polkinghorne (1995) uses story to signify “narratives that combine a 
succession of incidents into a unified episode” (p. 7). Whereas Labov had narrowed 
his definition of narrative to the recapitulation of a specific past experience, Barton 
(2000) has widened it up to include accounts of future events and habitual or 
generalized experience. For clarity’s sake I shall refer to the sampled texts generally 
as ‘accounts’ and apply story only to those accounts that do have a plot. Poems about 
the illness were excluded from the sample on grounds that a poem validates personal 
experience in different ways than does narrative, at least in Western culture.  
Suitable material was retrieved during several months with the aid of search 
engines and links found in various sites. The cut-off date was May 2, 2001, when 23 
texts satisfying the criteria were available (any interim updates of previously 
downloaded ones were incorporated into the analysis). The texts were obtained from 
five web sites and written by 12 individuals (7 female, 5 male) ranging in age, where 
known, from10 to 57 year old (4 under 20). Despite the ‘globalizes’ ethos of the 
Internet the sample is geographically limited: six people indicate a US state in which 
they live, and the rest except one (from Australia) seem to be North-American on the 
basis of clues in the text, such as references to schooling. This might be due to the fact 
that only accounts in English were sought, although the absence of British and other 
English-speaking nationalities is noteworthy. Two of the web sites are personal home 
pages, which need not be named. The other three are support and self-help resources. 
As it would do injustice to their creators not to mention them, I obtained permission to 
do so. Band Aides & Blackboards is an institution based site created by Joan Fleitas 
(1997, 1998) primarily for sick children, but also inviting adults’ reflections on their 
childhood experiences of any chronic illness. Jane’s Mental Health Source Page is a 
mixture between a weblog and resource center dedicated to depression, which also 
hosts other people’s stories. Michael Crawford’s Learn about Manic Depression page 
is chiefly a resource center, though containing his personal story (Story 2 below). The 
nature of the material moots some of the ethical conventions regarding anonymity and 
confidentiality (Smythe & Murray 2000). All the texts from which extracts are given 
below can be easily traced with a search engine. Importantly, they were intentionally 
put in the public domain—a form of publication—and the writers already took 
precautions to protect their privacy to the extent that they wished to remain 
anonymous. The report below does not go beyond what is given in the public domain 
with one exception (the background to Story 1), for which informed consent was 
granted. The two men whose stories are examined in depth had been contacted and 
gave their consent for my analysis and its publication. The writer of another text that 
had been initially selected couldn’t be contacted, and therefore this analysis was 
abandoned. 
The texts range in length from 223 to 5,355 words (mean: 1,233; median: 848) 
and are diverse in style. In terms of type, seven could be classed as stories, inasmuch 
as their chief theme is the writer’s illness history. The remainder consists of 
informative or contemplative essays, in which personal experiences illustrate various 
points, and diary entries. The heterogeneity of the sample is a theoretically germane 
finding. It could be concluded that asynchronous CMC invites ‘genre slippage’—even 
when the accounts concern the same topic, serve a similar purpose (e.g., telling others 
about BPD), and indeed even when they conform to the conventional definition of 
story. In writing for the CMC setting, some writer seem to model their storytelling on 
the FTF interaction: 
I’m glad you stopped by. My name is Joe, and I wanted to share my 
experience of bipolar illness.  
My name is Lynn, and I’m so pleased you’ve come to visit my page. Here’s 
a story that’s sad but true.  
Other writers take the modern novel as their model, and ‘hook’ the would-be reader 
with some thought-provoking or dramatic statement that is intrinsic to the topic at 
hand, as these first lines illustrate: 
Once your mind has breached the thought of suicide there is no turning back. 
I’ve decided tomorrow to make an appointment with a doctor because I want 
to get help.  
A classification of the texts in terms of ‘oral’ versus ‘literary’ openings did not reveal 
either strategy as predominant.  
Most of the sampled texts are skillfully written. It might well be that people 
who lack confidence in their ability to write eloquently don’t post their accounts. This 
auto-regulation of the virtual community might determine not only ‘whose’ voice is 
heard, but also what ‘voice’ (i.e., what consciousness of world) becomes more 
prominent in the ‘anonymous murmur’ or ‘relentless disordered drone’ of which 
Foucault and Deleuze spoke. 
The representation of BPD in the sample 
This section provides a tour of the sample as a prelude to the analysis of the 
two stories, so as to place them in a hermeneutic context. It is not a comprehensive 
review of themes found in the material, but a narrative about it. A convenient tool for 
structuring this section’s narrative is Moscovici’s social representation theory. Bauer 
and Gaskell (1999) define social representation as the meaning of something that 
arises from its joint interpretation by two or more individuals or groups, each bringing 
into the joint construction their memories of past understanding and plans for a future 
project. Here, a representation of BPD arises as a consequence of psychiatric 
knowledge being circulated, resisted, and transformed, alongside with diffused 
psychological ideas, all of which is interpreted from the writers’ intimate 
phenomenological knowledge of the illness experience.  
People diagnosed with BPD must cope, not only with the distressing 
symptoms and disruptions to day-to-day life and close relationships, but also with 
social stigma:  
This illness has been embarrassing, and because it is a hidden disability, I 
don’t have the freedom to talk about it. … I wish society had a healthier 
awareness of the nature of mental illness. If only that were to happen, the 
stigma that so many people experience might go away. (Joe) 
The devastating experience of being diagnosed is vividly captured in the following 
narrative juxtaposition: 
I will never forget the Earthquake of 2001 … as a couple days later within 
that same week I was told something I’ve always suspected. (Jen) 
Being told that she had BPD was earth shattering for her because it confirmed a life-
long dread due to her mother’s mental illness. However, the onset of BPD is seldom 
sudden. The diagnosis usually follows a long time, sometimes many years, in which 
mood cycles are experienced but not recognized as BPD. A central premise of social 
representation theory is that the contents of a representation form through ‘anchoring’ 
something novel and disturbing in something already known, and the ‘objectification’ 
of the newly anchored ideas (Moscovici, 1984). To some, the diagnosis comes as a 
relief. Lynn’s story starts: 
When I was in junior high and high school, I felt like I was a space alien 
dropped into the world and left there. It was awful. I had an illness that was 
invisible. 
It ends happily:  
But now—at last—this illness has a name. And the name is not ‘space alien’ 
or ‘worthless person’ or ‘social leper.’ It’s just Depression. 
Yet mental illness is seldom, if ever, experienced as ‘just’ a medical ailment: 
Just as people can fall sick to a cold or the flu, people can fall sick to 
depression or a neurobiochemical disorder that takes courage to reveal so 
treatment can be initiated. (Jane; italics added) 
The symptoms of BPD strike at the core of what it means to be a person, affecting 
emotional stability, self-control, ‘touch’ with reality, and intimate relationships:  
Bipolar illness prevents the one thing that is essential to a lasting 
relationship … This one thing is ‘stability’. Bipolar illness at its essence is a 
disease of instability or variability … Who can endure this madness? Most 
often not even those who love someone very deeply. (Christopher) 
Themes of guilt, self-blame, and self-loathing abound in the sample. The following 
extract is from diary notes written in the grip of a depressive episode: 
It is horrible to be me because I strip Life of all peace and happiness. I am a 
Black Gob of Slimey Goo, absorbing all that is good and leaving destruction 
and sadness in its wake. People I come in intimate contact with, I destroy 
their minds … I am drowning in fear of being myself yet cannot run away. 
… I am wrought with guilt, regret, and horror at the holocaust I have created 
with my mind, manifesting into actions. (Jane)  
The analogy with a cold or flu is one of three strategies (in the sample) for anchoring 
and objectifying the illness. A second strategy externalizes it by blaming human 
nature, i.e., not self: 
Mental illness at its core is a behavioral problem. … Essentially the will is 
weakened and therefore the ‘will to power’ is not sufficient to deny that 
which makes us behave. This may manifest itself in emotional outbursts, 
reckless spending, uncontrollable anger, inability to sleep, irrational 
responses, overtly sexualized behaviour, and in its ultimate form of 
unrestrained passion – murder and suicide. (Christopher) 
A third strategy coincides with the theme that Hayne (2003), in a phenomenological 
study on being diagnosed with mental illness, has labeled the “destructive gift of 
difference”:  
There is an ironic twist to being manic depressive. We are often creative and 
intelligent people. Poets and artists have long had a reputation for being 
moody and tormented people. (Michael) 
The view of manic depression as a ‘creative illness’ (Michael’s phrase) echoes an 
older clinical perspective. Vojta, Kinosian, Glick, et al. (2001) quote a psychoanalyst, 
Fenichel, who in 1945 described the euphoric presentations of manic and hypomanic 
episodes as “a positive, driving, forceful state” associated with an increase in self-
esteem, and patients as “hungry for objects … to express their own potentialities” (p. 
190). Yet the statistical analysis of patients’ self-reported quality of life carried out by 
Vojta et al. supports the opposite view of mania as thoroughly debilitating, 
characterized by “reduced rather than enhanced self-reported quality of life … 
suboptimal states of function, even from the patient’s point of view” (p. 194). 
Likewise, descriptions of manic episodes in the sample, even when evaluated 
positively, are offset by the negatively evaluated depressive episodes: 
I really enjoy the mania. I can get a lot of work done. … I jump around a lot 
and move really fast … Sometimes I’d put on some very grand and fast 
music … I would probably be laughing a lot and having lots of fun no matter 
what I’m doing.  
And then—then the realization that it’s all going to end soon. The 
feelings of happiness and joy will slowly seep back into the recesses of 
where they came from. And in their place the dark and searing pain of 
depression would ooze out. (Anakin) 
Whereas in the above description the problem lies in the uncontrollable oscillation, 
the following identifies the downside of mania itself: 
When I get my ‘ups’ I get feelings of elation. … It’s fun to begin with, but it 
gets very scary pretty soon since I lose my grip on reality. I’m easily 
angered during my up periods … I’m charging full steam ahead. It can get 
very exhausting for everyone I’m around, too, including me! (Emmie) 
Up to a point, the tension between the romantic and medical views could be put down 
to the difference between ascertaining how patients feel when they are in symptomatic 
states and asking how they feel about these states. The latter question calls for 
considering how the person’s narrative indexes those states in the whole of the illness 
experience, and how the illness is indexed in relation to self:  
Luckily, there are ways to control a bipolar illness so that I can live fairly 
normally … I hate taking medication, and I hate being constantly monitored, 
but it’s part of who I am. (Emmie) 
Medication is commonly talked about not only as a medical necessity, but also as 
instrumental for getting one’s ‘normal self’ back: 
Taking medication and going to therapy helped … It’s like one morning, I 
suddenly woke up and felt calm. Not sedated or drugged, just Normal. (Jane) 
Testimonies of desirable outcomes often carry idealized images of ‘normal life’ or 
what ‘normal’ people have or aspire to have: 
I’m happy to report that I have a wonderful loving wife who has helped me 
grow and has learned to understand my illness. … The great thing is that I 
no longer address my illness very much since my medication has been so 
successful!!! I owe my recovery and my happiness to God. (Joe) 
 
Verkuyten (1995) defines social representations as knowledge structures “used 
in dynamic context-sensitive ways and against a background of actions and goals” (p. 
276). The structuring core of the representation emerging in the sample has, not only 
‘positive’ content, i.e., explicit statements of what BPD is (albeit negatively 
evaluated) but also ‘negative’ content, consisting of implicit, often unvoiced, 
statements of what it is not (positively evaluated normality). As a counter-movement 
to cultural constructions of madness as the dark ‘otherness’ of rationality and moral 
integrity (cf. Foucault, 1967; Szasz, 1961), a myth of normality underpins the illness 
discourse in the sample. Malinowski (1926/1971) understood myth as “a vital 
ingredient of human civilization … a hard-working active force” (p. 19). According to 
Malinowski, various short accounts of the particular myth are each only a part, “and a 
rather insignificant one”, of a bigger story that is not told but lived, and what really 
matters about it is its social function (p. 43). Similarly, the sampled texts could be 
viewed as fragmentary accounts of a bigger story at the foundations of modern 
society. However, in late modernity what passes for normal has been challenged and 
fractured, so much so that reading the myth of normality from the sample is not 
simply a matter of identifying and classifying normative themes. Rather, the myth 
may reside in the tensions arising from juxtapositions of various claims about 
achieving a normal life.  
Both stories below tell about such achievement, but in contrasting ways. In 
reporting each story, my strategy will be a partial ‘narrative analysis’ insofar as this 
method entails a process that is “actually a synthesizing of the data rather than a 
separation into its constituent parts” (Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 15). The present 
‘synthesis of data’ is designed to bring out a common narrative image (cf. Frye, 1957) 
embodied in these stories, so as subsequently to address the theoretical issue of 
identity commitments. 
Story 1: “Manic depression was a problem for me” 
The 598-word long text was posted in 1998 on Jane’s Mental Health Source 
Page, where it opens a section reserved for contributions by other people (i.e., not 
Jane), and carries the heading “An Introduction”. I contacted the writer, Larry Miles, 
by email in March 2001, and during the following months we corresponded regularly 
about the work in progress. Story 1 is unique in the sample in that it tells of a non-
medical cure: at the time of writing it Larry claimed to have been free of the 
symptoms 18 years after stopping to take the medication. The story thus presents a 
memory of the illness from a biographical distance, although Larry’s continuing 
involvement in self-help exchanges implies that it remained a salient matter to him. 
His past illness empowers him to offer his experience as an example to others; but  (as 
will transpire) he does so by trading off some biographical accuracy for the sake of a 
strong message. 
The story begins with a disclosure of the illness as a problem for in the past, 
which sets up the expectancy of a happy end, and immediately holds back (suspense 
building):  
My name is Larry Miles and manic-depression was a problem for me for a 
long time. Before I tell any of my story I’d like to say up front how 
important it is to stay on your medication and do everything your doctor tells 
you. I did for eight years. 
The stress on saying it up front foreshadows a twist, the nature of which is given in 
the statement, “I did for eight years” (he’s not doing it anymore). This is the first in 
interwoven ironies characteristic of Larry’ storytelling style. The advice given up 
front would be completely turned around by the end of the story.  
There follows a detailed case history, specifying the medication taken and 
other treatments, the year of diagnosis, and the duration of hospitalization in named 
hospitals. In the communicative context, the account functions like a résumé that 
establishes the writer’s credibility as someone who knows about the illness. Within 
the dynamics of the story, it has the dramatic effect of the chronotope (a literary 
representation of the relationship between person, time and place) that Bakhtin (1981) 
called ‘adventure time in an alien world’. In tales of this genre, the hero leaves home 
and moves through alien landscapes, where dangers abound, and his interaction with 
that world is passive and reactive. Likewise, Larry at this stage has little control over 
his life. He is sent to a maximum-security ward, yet this terrifying environment is 
introduced ironically through positive emotion:   
I was glad when they locked me in a cell by myself at night. There were 
murderers and rapists and every other kind of violent mental deviant there. 
The ‘alien world’ is accentuated by the fact that he did not belong there: 
I was a benevolent manic with no violent behavior whatsoever. 
After his release, he vowed to do everything he was told, which he did: 
I just wanted to live a normal life and didn’t see any value in being so high 
that you couldn’t accomplish anything or take care of yourself.  
The narrative seems to switch here to another chronotope genre, in which 
biographical time unfolds in a predetermined sequence of personal states. In Bakhtin’s 
example for this genre, the ‘seeker of knowledge’ has to undergo sequential stages of 
personal transformation from ignorance through compliance with elders and finally to 
wisdom. For the moment, Larry is a seeker of normality speaking from a stage of 
compliance. He sympathetically disapproves of those manics (sic) who resist taking 
their medication:  
They like being high but if you can’t control it what good is it? A lot of them 
said that the doctors were just trying to take away their power. Well what 
were they doing with all that power? Nothing. 
This negative valuation of mania as power that you can’t control reveals the crisis at 
the heart of the story. The villain in the tale is that which robs Larry of the power of 
autonomy.  
The story soon slides back into its true genre of the ordeal adventure story. 
The hero has arrived at what appeared to be a safe haven, but he hasn’t passed the 
ultimate test of virtue. Sooner or later the illusion of safety shatters and he faces an 
ordeal worse than ever before: 
No major problems for about 6 years then started having nervous problems 
like panic attacks which terrified me. 
The major turning point in the story now takes place. Deciding that it was time to 
“take control of my life in some manner” Larry read a self-help book:  
I followed [the author’s] advice and learned to relax and accept my 
symptoms without fear. One day they vanished of their own accord which 
gave me more confidence in myself than you can imagine. I knew I was free 
from any type of nervous disorder.  
Mapping the story onto the plot axis of traditional folktales (Propp, 1928/1958), the 
book functions like the magical element that appears to help the hero in the hour of 
greatest need. Typically in tales, the unexpected magical element is a reward for some 
good deed earlier in the journey (e.g., helping a wounded creature, sharing bread with 
a poor old man, etc.), when the hero first exercises free will. Larry’s ‘good deed’ is 
deciding to adhere to the book’s advice. Leading to the final confrontation, the hero of 
tales demonstrates his prowess and, at last, becomes actively engaged in the 
enactment of his destiny. Likewise, with the predictability of a fairytale, mastering his 
fear of the symptoms brings about the successful resolution of Larry’s crisis: 
Without my fear and co-operation they could not live. I cured myself by 
doing nothing! … Nothing was attacking me I was simply pinching myself 
in a mysterious sort of way. I tell people this all the time and they end up 
saying that that’s too easy. 
Three rhetorical devises communicate the image of a miraculous cure: a metaphor of 
the symptoms as malevolent creatures (“they could not live”; nothing attacking him); 
the paradox of curing himself by doing nothing; and a sense of enigma (pinching 
himself; people’s incredulity).  
Yet this fairytale narrative underpins precisely the opposite message—that 
there is a rational explanation according to Larry. The distinction between reality and 
the wishful fantasy of an easy cure is made clear next: 
Well let me tell you that it is not easy accepting and relaxing into a panic 
attack that leaves you so dizzy and disoriented that you can barely stand. But 
if you can do it consistently and learn the knack you too will know you 
freedom from any type of nervous illness.  
The rational explanation is a psychological one: 
I’ve been free of medication and worries about it for 18 years now. The 
major difference? Acceptance, and a changed attitude towards the 
symptoms. 
The moral of the story is its ultimate double irony, overturning the advice given up 
front: accept the symptoms, not the doctor’s advice; embrace them, and they go away.  
The deep movement of the story is from external to internal control. It is a 
healing story, expertly performed in natural storytelling that utilizes the powerful 
archetype of the hero’s journey. In our correspondence, Larry explained that it was 
originally emailed as a ‘pep talk’ (his phrase) to someone who had been recently 
diagnosed (personal communication, 14 March 2001). He stressed that his recovery 
was hardly the consequence of reading one book, but the culmination of several 
therapies over an extensive period of time. When we know that the story originated in 
a personal email, we ‘receive’ it as one side of a conversation, and may wonder how 
relevant was Larry’s experience for the addressee of the email. In contrast, when it is 
encountered as a monologue on the Internet without knowledge of its background, it 
might be read as missionary and invite ideological arguments. Some people read it as 
subversive and dangerous, and wrote their objections to Larry. Online the article is 
now followed with a response, posted in 2000, which stresses that people diagnosed 
as bipolar must remain on medication for the rest of their life. The writer of the 
response concedes the possibility that Larry was misdiagnosed, and therefore it was 
possible for him to stop taking the medication. The insinuation is that Larry either 
deludes himself or is not a genuine bipolar. Either way, the healing message is 
discredited. 
Bakhtin (1986) posited that a text as an utterance is defined by “its plan 
(intention) and the realization of the plan”; it is the “dynamic interrelations of these 
aspects, their struggle, which determines the nature of the text” (p. 104). Whilst 
readers’ reception of the plan-and-realization of the story may vary according to 
assumptions about its communicative context and the writer’s purpose, there is also a 
struggle intrinsic to this story which remains constant across different contexts. It is 
the dramatic struggle between the specific crisis contingent on the illness and the 
conditions for its resolution. A further point is that the plan of the text is not identical 
with the writer’s intention, although in this case the two are confluent (I shall argue 
that in Story 2 they are not). Larry’s intention to offer hope to the other person is 
actualized in the text’s plan (a pep talk) which is realized through a brief, simple 
narrative conforming to a universally recognized pattern. It is the pattern that Propp 
found to be at the core of the morphology of Russian folktales, and which Bakhtin 
associated with the ancient ‘ordeal adventure’ genre. Central to such stories is the 
hero’s journey through trials and tribulations towards achieving his goal. It is 
archetypal in Frye’s (1957) non-Jungian definition of ‘archetype’ as a highly 
communicative narrative unit or image (although Jungian theory purports to explain 
why it is highly communicative). 
Story 2: “I am Manic Depressive” 
The 1,724-words essay entitled “I am Manic Depressive” introduces the web 
page created by Michael Crawford, which also contains a very brief article (“The 
Creative Illness”), annotated bibliography, and relevant links. It is part of a highly 
personal web site, rich in textual and visual information about its creator. I contacted 
Michael in March 2001 and was granted his informed consent for this study. The 
essay in focus can be spliced into two threads: (1) impersonal information about BPD, 
symptoms and medication, illustrated with personal anecdotes; (2) a personal story 
about writing the web page, interwoven with an ‘impersonal’ thesis on the 
construction of social realities, germane to the story. I shall refer to the whole text as 
the essay and to the latter thread as the story; this is Story 2. Its deep structure 
conforms to the archetypal pattern as identified in Story 1, though here the image is 
submerged. To bring out, I shall signpost the plot axis identified by Propp 
(1928/1958) with verbatim quotations kept in their original sequence as in his scheme 
(pp. 130-134).  
Tales begin with a statement of “the initial situation” (Propp). The essay opens 
with a one-sentence paragraph: 
I am manic depressive. 
This repeats the essay’s title, immediately above it, creating a visual emphasis. A 
verbal ‘eye contact’ with the reader is established next with a statement about the 
purpose of the web page: 
I’d like you to know more about manic depression, so you can better 
understand the other manic depressive people you know, and if you’re manic 
depressive yourself, I’d like to offer you a bit of encouragement and 
companionship. Eventually I should have some useful resources [hyperlink] 
linked from here. 
Throughout the essay, the predominant mode of thought is what Bruner (1986) calls 
paradigmatic, which is concerned with categorization, internal connections or logical 
relationships, and truth in terms of a universal abstraction. Bruner contrasts this with 
the narrative mode, which is concerned with personal and social ramifications of 
events and relationships, strives to establish and affirm consensual meanings, and 
utilizes framing devices to separate story from reality. The paradigmatic is never 
relinquished in the essay, but the narrative mode of the embedded story provides an 
undercurrent.  
From the outset, the writer is self-positioned as a facilitator of knowledge, 
which positions the reader in the complementary role of a seeker of knowledge. As in 
Story 1, the biographical detail that follows functions like a résumé establishing the 
writer’s expertise: 
I have been through some very difficult times. But through hard work, 
therapy, and medicine, I am able to live quite a good life. 
Unlike Story 1, this is not the story of Michael’s ordeal. We are yet to find out what it 
is about and that there’s a story at all. There follows details of Michael’s diagnosis, 
specific terms are explained paradigmatically, and the jargon is light-heartedly 
challenged: 
I don’t particularly like the term “bipolar” because it lacks the romantic flair 
of “manic depression.”  
In the traditional tale, the adventure is set in motion when “the hero receives 
information about the villain” and an act of “villainy” takes place (Propp). Here the 
adventure of creating the page begins with something preventing it: 
I have wanted to write about being manic depressive for quite some time. I 
have been hesitant to do so for several reasons… 
The dramatic crisis here is not the illness, but the inability to talk about it. One of the 
reasons for the hesitation is a perceived lack of skill (Propp: “Elements lacking, 
missing”): 
It’s hard to write something good enough to get into print in a magazine or a 
book. It’s much easier to put my writing on the web.  
The more profound lack is that of courage to disclose the illness: 
I’m afraid I’m also quite worried about what some people would think of 
me. … But I hate keeping secrets. I sure don’t like living in a closet. 
This repositions the writer as someone seeking a sympathetic ear. Plot-wise, these 
statements frame a period of hesitation, deliberation, and not communicating. In 
keeping with the paradigmatic style, the personal lack is pinpointed through 
generalization:  
There are a lot of people in this world who are discriminated against because 
of their race, their religion, [etc.] … and many of these people have been 
able to improve their lot by working together and making their voices heard. 
But crazy people don’t stick together. In fact we are usually quite isolated, 
from each other and from normal human companionship.  
The chronotope here accords with the most recent of novelistic genres identified by 
Bakhtin (1981), the cultural-historical variant of the Bildungsroman in which 
psychological emergence is inextricably linked to historical processes, and personal 
development is no longer a private affair. In accordance with this chronotope, the 
source of villainy is not external—it is not the social stigma of “crazy people”—but 
an internal group process, its collective reticence and lack of solidarity. Realizing this 
prescribes a specific course of action that involves assigning to group members the 
duty to speak out and change history (Propp: “Consent to counter-action”): 
We need to be known, and to be heard. There’s really only one way for us to 
change that, and it is for each of us to individually stand up and speak out. 
In Propp’s sequence, the consent to counter-action is followed with the “dispatch of 
the hero from home.” As in tales, a definite dramatic event compels the hero to seek 
out and challenge the villain:  
I decided to put this page up right now in particular because of something 
that has happened that has quite shocked and horrified me. 
The event was the mass suicide of the Heaven’s Gate cult.  
There follows the “struggle with the villain” (Propp). News of the event 
brought back memories of past suicidal feelings, but more poignantly initiated a 
questioning about the truth of the reality in which the accountability of the mentally ill 
is discredited: 
Most people think that the things they experience and that they believe are 
real. The Heaven’s Gate members were not depressed … and they seemed to 
sincerely believe they were doing the right thing.  
A long and well-articulated argument unfolds: social influence in cults is normal in-
group processes, and therefore all our realities are socially constructed. Michael’s 
social constructionist thesis validates the reality of the mentally ill as equal to any 
other: 
The news depicted this event as something very unusual, strange and 
uncommon. What disturbs me though, is … that I think that the grip we have 
on reality is a lot more tenuous than most people believe. By “we” I don’t 
mean just mentally ill people, I mean everyone - including average, normal 
people. Including you. 
“Including you” brings about another repositioning. Whereas up to now readers may 
interact with the story as a sympathetic but uninvolved listener, now the twist is that 
we are “in” it, it is also our story (and the writer again is in the position of having 
knowledge to impart).  
Next, “victory over the villain” (Propp): if the villain in this story is the self-
imposed silence, victory is not simply asserting one’s right to be heard, but more 
fundamentally, asserting the duty to speak. The right may be externally granted, but 
overcoming a silence that is self-imposed is an internal process, empowered by the 
conviction that one has something important to say: 
In some ways the mentally ill people have the advantage; once we have been 
through some time of treatment, we learn to construct a reality that is more 
reliable than the one that just happens to everyone else.  
According to Propp, victory over the villain is often followed with putting some gain 
to an immediate use; e.g., breaking of a charm, freedom from captivity, or doing away 
with misfortune through the application of a magical agent (“The liquidation of a loss 
or harm”). Here, the realization that realities are constructed is applied to the 
immediate purpose of the web page. The advice now given is a direct gain from the 
social construction thesis: 
To recover from an illness like manic depression, one must learn to 
construct a better reality, and to keep a hold of it even as the forces of one’s 
own feelings struggle to overturn it. There are things that can help, like 
medicine and psychotherapy, and I use these, but ultimately it is up to the 
individual to learn the skills …  
In Propp’s scheme, the initial reprieve from misfortune could be transient or a 
transitory stage, trials and tribulations might yet follow (“Difficult task”): 
The medicines are not completely effective though. Staying sane takes work.  
The final triumph over the villain of silence concludes the story and also brings the 
essay to a close: 
I just finished a little particularly challenging bit of that work. My parents 
came to visit, and I showed them my nice office and successful company, 
my spacious house … and had a dinner in a Thai restaurant. All very genteel 
activities calculated to set the parental mind at ease … I had printed out this 
web page and planning on showing it to them. I was shaking and sweating 
this whole time, and came very close to canceling it. But in the end we were 
able to talk about it, with great difficulty and much shyness and 
embarrassment. I think this may have been the first time they actually were 
able to understand my condition. 
The vignette creates a narrative time warp (reporting the outcomes of showing his 
parents the page in which the outcomes are told) and its insertion in the essay 
significantly alters the plan and realization of the text. It dramatically pulls together 
all the threads and retrospectively makes the whole essay read as a truly personal tale 
of deliverance; and, by a kind of ripple effect, repositions the reader as a witness to 
the writer’s private struggle. “This web page” which is printed and shown to the 
parents functions like a transitional object (cf. Winnicott 1971)—a concrete object 
representing Michael’s transition from being merged with the illness to relating to it 
as something external and separate, hence being able to talk about it. 
Fairytales end with “the solution (accomplishment) of a task” (Propp). 
Likewise the outcome of the parents’ visit is a definite, final and irreversible 
resolution of the communication crisis. In reality there is no ‘ever after’—as 
insinuated in the framing of the event as recent and partial (“I just finished… bit of 
that work”) and further in the final paragraph, which has the ‘feel’ of the denouement 
that Propp labeled “leave taking at a roadside post”:  
I want to say more but the door is open now, and we can send each other e-
mail about it, and I can direct them to online resources for the parents of 
mentally ill. 
The locus of identity commitments 
There are several dimensions of differentiation between the two stories. 
Whereas Story 1 is told retrospectively (“manic depression was a problem for me”), 
Story 2 has the immediacy of psychological emergence: by the end Michael emerges 
as someone who can declare “I am manic depressive” at the beginning. A similar 
narrative loop exists in Story 1, but there it is stated up front; in Michael’s essay it 
takes us by surprise. Whereas Story 1 is a healing story that uses personal experience 
to empower its target audience, Story 2 is a story of self-empowerment through the 
prosocial act of creating the Internet resource. Put another way, Michael’s act of 
communion enabled his agency; Larry’s agency enables his act of communion. 
However, in common with each other and with the other sampled texts, the stories 
commit their implied authors to social-moral positions or ‘identities’ in relation to the 
illness. 
The terminology of identity commitments is used mostly in adolescence 
research (to my knowledge). The identity status paradigm, developed by Marcia 
nearly 40 years ago, posits the presence or absence of exploration and commitment in 
areas of occupation, ideology, and interpersonal values as the criteria for determining 
adolescents’ identity status (e.g., Marcia 2001). In the present use, identity 
commitments are not viewed as an expression of personality states but as a function of 
texts that are told in the first person singular. The concept should be distinguished 
from McAdams’ (e.g., 1993) concept of ‘imago’ as a personified, idealized image of 
the self that functions like a protagonist in life stories. An identity commitment is not 
a personification, not an image of ‘person’, but an implicit condition for the person-
to-world relation. In this respect, it is closer to Jung’s definition of imago as “an 
image of the subjective relation to the object” (1921/1971, para. 812; see Jones, 2003, 
for a comparison of McAdams and Jung). Keeping the focus on texts, ‘identity 
commitment’ resembles Bakhtin’s chronotope; however, whereas chronotope is a 
function of the plot, identity commitments are a function of the authorial ‘voice’, i.e., 
the particular consciousness of the world embodies in the specific account. In this 
respect the concept resembles Foucauldian subject positions and Harré’s positioning 
(see Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). My thesis is that identity commitments arise 
from the confluence of three aspects of the personal account, demonstrated in turn 
through a comparison of Stories 1 and 2.  
(1) The text’s plan and realization  
As mentioned, Bakhtin (1986) attributed the nature of a text to the struggle 
between its ‘plan’ the realization of the plan. Whereas the plan and realization of 
Story 1 are confluent with Larry’s purpose of telling it (offering support), insofar as 
the plan of Story 2 is self-empowerment, it strays off from Michael’s reason for 
telling it (explaining how the web page came to be). Although both stories contain the 
hero’s journey archetype, only Story 1 ‘works’ through this image. Story 1 realizes its 
plan (pep talk) through telling of an ordeal with a happy ending. Because it works 
through an image, it could be told in the third person without compromising its plan (I 
may tell about Larry as a pep talk to someone). In contrast, Story 2 realizes its plan 
(self-empowerment) through the reader/writer positioning and repositioning. Telling it 
in the third person would result in a story about Michael that I may tell for various 
reasons, but its plan would not be (my) self-empowerment.  
As an analytic variable, the plan-and-realization construct is discrete, 
relatively independent from both the emplotment (cf. Ricoeur, 1984) and plot macros-
structure (cf. Gergen, 1994), as could be seen in variations on similar themes in the 
sample. Other texts allude to the villainy of silence, but redemption through social 
identity is unique to Story 2. Other texts in the sample tell about confronting the 
symptoms, but Story 1 is unique in telling about long-term remission without 
medication. There are other themes. For instance, as seen in earlier extracts, Lynn’s 
story arches from the opening disclosure, “I had an illness that was invisible” to the 
concluding discovery, “this illness has a name.” She attributes her childhood 
loneliness and peer victimization to ignorance about her condition. If the villain in her 
tale is ignorance, the way to overcome it is through scientific knowledge (which she 
obtains by studying psychology at university). In common, Lynn’s, Larry’s, and 
Michael’s stories tell of a turn from bad to good fortune—a progressive plot 
(Gergen)—and all three writers express their wish to advise and encourage other BPD 
sufferers. In contrast, a brief narrative by a middle-aged woman, nicknamed Sunshine, 
has a regressive plot structure. It begins with a rosy though generalized depiction of 
life in Iowa “where people are friendly, except my neighbors” and the downward 
curve continues to the ending:  
Life is no fun for me anymore except for music listening. I have Depression, 
anxiety and panic attacks. I have been in therapy and support groups many 
years. 
It is part of a personal web page that also celebrates her love of music and is profusely 
decorated with cheerful animations of country music motifs. The autobiographical 
account has no message to fellow sufferers. If its plan is self-empowerment, it is 
realized through an assertion of her individuality, which effectuates a commitment to 
being alone in suffering the illness—in sharp contrast with the realization of the self-
empowerment in Story 2. 
 (2) Domain transversality  
Schrag (1997) employed the metaphor of transversality as a way of locating 
the unitary narrative-self in a diagonal movement across ‘culture spheres’ (science, 
art, religion, and ethics). Identity commitments involve domain transversality at the 
micro level of the singular text, though not necessarily across culture spheres. Most 
texts in the sample posit some existential crisis, contingent on BPD, and its resolution 
across the three abstract dimensions of experiencing oneself that William James 
(1890) discussed as domains of the ‘empirical self’. Namely, the material self, 
comprised of one’s body, clothes, house and so forth; the social self, based in the 
recognition one receives from others; and the spiritual self, a reflective process, the 
result of our ability “to think of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as thinkers” (p. 
296). Story 1 identifies a crisis of the material self and finds its resolution in the 
spiritual self. In Story 2 both crisis and resolution lie within the social self, but 
transverse the agency/communion dimension. The crisis-and-resolution dynamic is 
explicit in the storied texts (it ‘makes’ the story), but also implicit in most other texts.  
The question of how fundamental is domain transversality for the narrative 
‘selfing’ process remains a matter for further research. 
(3) The moral space into which the text leads us  
Stories 1 and 2 both tell of redemption, mapping a pathway for a good life 
despite the illness, but the paths lead in opposite directions. Story 2 leads to accepting 
the illness by making it part of the sufferer’s identity. Story 1 leads to getting rid of it, 
which denies its existence as part of the person, acknowledging it only as misfortune. 
The stories reproduce alternative moral spaces around the experience of mental 
illness, spaces that readers would invoke if they judge which story is ‘better’ in terms 
of mental health. If Michael’s acceptance is viewed as healthier than Larry’s denial, 
the invoked space reproduces a ‘medical’ discourse in which mind is subordinate to 
body (a rational mind accepts the inevitability of a neurobiochemical disorder such as 
BPD). If Larry’s self-determination is viewed as more resilient than Michael’s 
internalization, the invoked space reproduces a ‘humanistic’ discourse in which body 
is subordinate to the human spirit—and those who are not as fortunate as Larry might 
be positioned as lacking in resolve and strength of character. A resistance to this 
insinuation is evinced in readers’ reactions to Story 1, as mentioned earlier, which 
deploy the medical discourse so as to query the message of Story 1.  
In sum, identity commitments are not recurrent ‘themes’ to be abstracted from 
narratives, but ways in which the whole text uniquely orients to the experience they 
narrate.  In their public life, texts such as examined above contribute to the ‘myth of 
normality’ by virtue of their juxtaposition in readers’ reception. As a social force (cf. 
Malinowski), this myth does not lies in any particular discourse (the medical is no 
more the locus of ‘myth’ qua fallacy than is the humanistic one or any other) but in 
the intersubjective construction of certain accounts as morally incompatible with each 
other. A fuller exploration of this aspect of the study awaits future work (in progress). 
The utility of ‘identity commitments’ as an analytic variable may lie in the scope for 
applying it at the intrapersonal level. As redefined in Jones (1997), reflexive 
positioning involves construing the subjective implications of two or more positions 
that the same situation affords the person. This could be explored through identity 
commitments made in various texts by the same person (cf. Jones 2002).  
Reflection 
Taylor (1989) submitted that to ‘have’ a self entails grasping one’s life in 
narrative, i.e., having a story of where we come from and where we’re going, which is 
underpinned by an orientation in a space of moral questions. This is particularly 
poignant in the case of people whose lives are disrupted by bipolar disorder. Telling 
others about the possibility of healing is a deeply moral action, which the Internet 
enables to an unprecedented extent. Posting personal testimonies counters and is 
countered by the narcissistic or strategic reflexivity accentuated by CMC—a perpetual 
motion or ‘fluid’ boundary between private and public domains: 
If you find yourself in my diary, that’s probably because you too are sick of 
suffering from something that is very treatable. (Jane) 
Unless some communication is initiated between reader and writer, the writer’s 
private reflexive project remains opaque to readers. If we are moved by it, we are 
probably moved by projections of our own anxieties, desires, fears and hopes. Rather 
than diminish the power of the story, the anonymity of its teller focuses attention onto 
its universal message: “It is the universalizing of the plot that universalizes the 
characters, even when they have specific names” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 41). The implied 
author of the personal story becomes a generic figure, like the hero of a folktale.  
The paradox of CMC storytelling is that even when the protagonists are 
anonymous, their story remains individualized. It is ‘received’ as someone’s 
intellectual property and evidence of his or her private journey—a fossil footprint that 
becomes an integral part of an altered landscape.  
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